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21 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW-STATE
TAX ON GIFTS MADE WITHIN SIX YEARS OF DONOR'S DEATH.-

[United States] A Wisconsin statute levied a progressive tax upon
transfers at death or made in contemplation of death, and provided
that all material transfers made within six years of the transferrer's.
death, without adequate valuable consideration, should be construed
as made in contemplation of death within the meaning of .the law.
The rates progressed from 1 to 15 per cent according to the size
of the estate.' One Schlesinger died testate in 1921, and, in proceedings to tax his estate, it was found that within six years he
had made four separate gifts to his wife and children, amounting
to over $5,000,000, none of which were actually made in contemplation of death. The Milwaukee county court subjected these gifts
to the transfer tax and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed
this order.2 In Schlesinger v. Wisconsin3 the United States Supreme
Court held this to be a violation of the Fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Holmes (with whom concurred Brandeis and Stone, JJ.)
gave a dissenting opinion. The gist of Mr. Justice McReynold's
reasoning for the majority appears in the following quotation:
"The court below declared that a tax on gifts inter vivos only could
not be so laid as to hit those made within six years of the donor's death
and exempt all others-this would be 'wholly arbitrary.' We agree with
this view and are of opinion that such a classification would be in plain
conflict with the Fourteenth amendment. The legislative actiofh here
challenged is no less arbitrary. Gifts inter vivos within six years of
death, but in fact made without contemplation thereof, are first conclusively presumed to have been so made without regard to actualities,
while like gifts at other times are not thus treated. There is no adequate basis for this distinction. Secondly, they are subjected to graduated taxes which could not properly be laid on all gifts or, indeed,
upon any gift without testamentary character.
"The presumption and consequent taxation are defended upon the
theory that, exercising judgment and discretion, the legislature found
them necessary in order to prevent evasion of inheritance taxes. That
is to say, A may be required to submit to an exactment forbidden by
the Constitution if this seems necessary in order to enable the state
readily to collect lawful charges against B. Rights guaranteed by the
federal Constitution are not to be so lightly treated; they are superior
to this supposed necessity. The state is forbidden to deny due process
of law or the equal protection of the laws for any purpose whatsoever." 4
In his dissent Mr. Justice Holmes suggests that if the time
were six months instead of six years the power of the state would
not be denied, as the difficulty of proof would warrant making the
presumption absolute, and that reasonable men might regard six
years as not too remote for this purpose. That some gifts not made
in contemplation of death will be hit by such a tax he regards as
within the principle that considerations of administration may justify
1.
2.
3.
4.

Wis. R. S. 1921 sec. 72.01-2.
Estate of Schlesinger (1924) 184 Wis. 1.
(1926) 46 S. Ct. Rep. 260.
46 S. Ct. Rep. at 261.

COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

the inclusion within a proscribed class of some innocent articles or
transactions, as in the instances made familiar by prohibition legislation.
It is to be noted that the majority opinion contains not a word
to indicate that its decision would be otherwise were the six-year
period greatly shortened. It-being admitted by everyone that a tax
upon gifts inter vivos could not be made to depend upon the accident of occurring within a certain period of the donor's death, can
gifts within even a short time of a donor's death be conclusively
presumed to be in contemplation of death? If nearly everyone who
died were so ill for at least six months before as to excite reasonable apprehension of his demise, such a presumption for gifts
within-that period would really stand; or if the presumption were
confined to persons over sixty years old. But obviously a good
many not elderly people in apparently good health are killed by accidents or die from sudden and acute ailments, and as to them such
a presumption, if made conclusive, lacks that 'rational connection
betveen the fact proved [a gift within six months of death] and
the ultimate fact presumed' [contemplation of death] which is
required for even a prima facie presumption. 5 There is at least fair
reason to believe that no gift within a period, however short, before
death, could be conclusively presumed to be made in contemplation of
death, without regard to any circumstance save that of death actually
ensuing. The new provision in the federal Revenue Act of 1926
making such a presumption conclusive as to transfers within two
years of death is perhaps open to the same objection under the due
process clause of the Fifth amendment, though this is not nearly so
sweeping a prohibition of somewhat arbitrary discrimination as is
the equality clause of the Fourteenth amendment.
The intimation of the majority that gifts inter vivos could not
be subjected to taxes graduated like those in many inheritance tax
statutes seems only partly tenable. If the tax is graduated according to the aiwut of each individual gift, the per cent taken increasing progressively with the size of the gift, it is hard to-understand
the objection to it under the Fourteenth amendment. Gifts are
simply divided into classes according to amount and a tax rate fixed
for each class, a procedure familiar in various forms of taxation,
notably income and inheritance taxes. But if the gift tax is graduated according to the total amount of the estate ultimately left
by the donor, perhaps many years after the gift, this seems an essentially irrational method of measuring a tax. The Wisconsin tax,
however, was apparently measured by the amount of the individual
gifts. The federal gift tax of 1924 was graduated according to the
total amount of gifts made by a donor during a calendar year, and
was assessed against the donor. The tax irhp6sed on gifts to A
and B was thus affected by the amount of gifts independently made
to C and D during this period, but probably the total extent of a
5. See Mobile, J. & K. C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed (1910) 219 U. S. 35,
4244.
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donor's bounty during a single year is not an irrational measure of
a tax upon it as a whole-such tax not being subject to the effect
of some purely fortuitous circumstance like the donor's death.
JAmES PARKER HALL.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-THE HARRISON ANTI-NARCOTIC ACT

PowER.-[United States]
The case of United States v. Daughtery' evidences a change of front,
and an insistence that hereafter the federal taxing power shall be
used as a means of raising revenue and not as a means of enforcing
a national police power. In it the Supreme Court of the United
States takes a radical departure from its long established practice
of only considering the constitutionality of statutes when the issue
is forced upon it, and in no case when the question has not been
raised in the lower court. In reviewing a sentence which was imposed for a violation of the so-called Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, it
remanded the case for the correction of some errors, but with the
suggestion that on the further proceedings the constitutionality of.
the Anti-Narcotic Act should be questioned. It admits that the2
validity of that Act was sustained in the case of U. S. v. Doremus,
but says that"The doctrine approved in Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U. S. 251, 38
S. Ct. Rep. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101, 3 A. L. R. 649, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 724;
Child Labor Tax case 259 U. S.20, 42 S. Ct. Rep. 449, 66 L. ed. 817;
Hill v. Wallace 259 U. S. 44, 67, 42 S. Ct. Rep. 453, 66 L. ed. 822;
and Linder v. United States 268 U. S. 5, 45 S. Ct. Rep. 446, 69 L. ed.
819: may necessitate a review of that question, if hereafter properly
presented."
The Harrison Narcotic Drug Act, section 1, requires all persons producing, importing, manufacturing, compounding, dealing in,
selling, dispensing, distributing, or giving away narcotic drugs to
register with the collector of internal revenue and to pay a special
tax of one dollar per annum and makes it unlawful to import, sell,
etc., such goods without having first registered. Section 2 requires
all orders given for such drugs to be written on a form issued by
the commissioner of internal revenue and makes it an offense to sell,
etc., such drugs, except on such order.
In the case of United States v. Doremus,3 the constitutionality
of this act was sustained under the authority of Article 1, section 8,
of the federal Constitution, which gives the Congress power "to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and
to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States."
In sustaining the validity of this Act, the court stated that the
only limitation upon the power of Congress to levy excise taxes was
AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING

1. '46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 156.

2. 249 U. S. 86.

3. 249 U. S.86.

